The End of Engagement: US-China Relations, Geopolitical Tensions, and China's Victimhood Culture

The podcast discusses the profound shift in US-China relations, marking the end of a nearly half-century framework of engagement that began with Kissinger and Nixon's 1972 visit. This breakdown is attributed primarily to China's failure to reciprocate economic openness with political reform, particularly after the Tiananmen Square massacre, which instilled a deep-seated fear of internal dissent within the Communist Party. This led to an increasingly unlevel playing field in markets, where China maintained protectionist policies while benefiting from open access abroad, creating growing inequities that became intolerable for the US and other nations. The initial US hope that economic integration would lead to China's liberalization into liberal democratic values ultimately proved unfounded.\n\nOrville Schell highlights that while President Trump aggressively confronted these issues, the underlying problems of unfair trade, blocked market access for US companies, and forced technology transfer had been mounting for years, recognized by figures like Kurt Campbell and Blackwell at the CFR even before Trump's campaign. China's leaders, despite their sophistication, are seen as alienating countries globally due to a perceived "overweening ambition" and Xi Jinping's insular, non-cosmopolitan leadership style, which relies on formality rather than genuine global engagement. A key distinction is drawn between China's unprecedented economic success and its continued adherence to a "victim culture" ideology rooted in the "hundred years of humiliation," which paradoxically prevents it from acknowledging its achievements and engaging as an equal global power.\n\nGiven this dangerous downward spiral, reinforced by economic, political, military, human rights, and geopolitical forces, the podcast explores potential paths forward. Schell suggests that a future Biden administration should initiate a major global effort to recalibrate the relationship, focusing on areas of common interest such as climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation. He proposes appointing a high-level figure, possibly Bill Clinton, to lead such an initiative, acknowledging that while the effort is essential, China's current leadership, particularly Xi Jinping, may not be capable of the spontaneous, open, and innovative response required for a fundamental shift.\n\nThe broader implications of this disengagement are global, with China increasingly alienating a diverse range of countries, including Sweden, Norway, Australia, India, and various European nations (e.g., UK, Germany, Czech Republic, Denmark), many of whom are now viewing China with caution, especially concerning national security issues like 5G technology and Huawei. The military dimension, with flashpoints in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the East China Sea, adds an inflammatory layer to the commercial and technological competition. The podcast underscores how China's historical narrative of victimhood continues to shape its aggressive foreign policy, hindering genuine collaboration and creating a perilous global landscape where both the US and China are struggling to build a fabric of global allies.

"we are at the end of a period of almost a half a century of a framework that did manage to keep the us and china in a reasonably uh constructive uh and increasingly engaged mode"

"the thing that really really impressed me uh was the degree to which the united states over a period of eight presidential administrations almost every single president didn't matter if they came in raging against you know the butchers from beijing to baghdad or you know against communism they all came out trying to support engagement trying to steady the course and to keep the united states committed to interacting with china under the supposition that china would slowly uh change"

"the beijing massacre and that really sadly in retrospect i have to say and i was there during most of it and and i felt in many ways it was completely justified what people were asking for but it did put a stake through the heart of the communist party's comfort level with the idea of reform"

"this created an inequity a lack of reciprocity an unleveled playing field that became uh increasingly less tolerable"

"when the businessmen were lost then china really had no one in the United States supporting uh the idea uh that engagement was a functional ongoing you know process that would would ultimately bring us make us more convergent rather than divergent"

"the sense that china's current leaders have that the u.s is in decline has given them a kind of a an unrealistic sense of their own omnipotence and their own power almost like a tragic a greek tragedy in which the hero over weaning ambition and humorous overreaches and uh comes a cropper"

"he is not a very cosmopolitan man he has never been abroad does not speak a foreign language and i think fundamentally doesn't feel particularly comfortable in global company"

"it hasn't translated into any less of a sense of victimhood and in fact the old ideology of anti-imperialism and victimization and humiliation uh continues on to be the predominant party ideology even as they have this incredibly startling historic never equaled in the history of the world success"

"you cannot be uh successful and a victim at the same time so in a certain sense china's insistence on maintaining its victim culture uh denies it the very sense of successfulness and accomplishment that it deserves"

"if that dam were to ever go it would wipe out many cities downstream including shanghai and it would be one of the great great sort of uh uh you know uh disasters of history so that highlights the importance of climate change"